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Recently S. Papadimitrious et al. have proposed a new probabilistic encryption scheme based on
chaotic systems. In this letter, we point out some problems with Papadimitrious et al.’s chaotic
cryptosystem: 1) the size of the ciphertext and the plaintext cannot simultaneously ensure practical
implementation and high security; 2) the estimated number of all possible virtual states is wrong; 3)
the practical security to exhaustive attack is overestimated; 4) the fast encryption speed is dependent
on the first defect; 5) problems about the dynamical degradation of digital chaotic systems; 6) no
explicit indications are given to explain how to construct the virtual state space with the 2d virtual
attractors, the 2e virtual states and the permutation matrix P. The detailed analyses and discussions
on the above problems show that the proposed chaotic cipher is insecure and unpractical. Also, we
give our suggestions on the design of general digital chaotic ciphers, and give some open topics in
this area.
1. Introduction
It has been well-known that tight relationship exists
between chaos and cryptography [Brown & Chua,
1996]. Many fundamental characteristics of chaos,
such as ergodicity, mixing property and sensitivity
to initial conditions/control parameters [Hao, 1993],
can be connected with some cryptographic properties
of good ciphers, such as confusion/diffusion, balance
and avalanche property [Schneier, 1996]. As a new
source of cryptography, chaos has attracted much at-
tention in recent years. Besides secure communica-
tion approaches based on chaos synchronization tech-
nique [G. Alvarez et al., 1999], the ideas of using digi-
tal (i.e., discrete-value discrete-time) chaotic systems
to construct cryptosystems have also been proposed
[E. Alvarez et al., 1999; Baptista, 1998; Frey, 1993;
Fridrich, 1998; Habutsu et al., 1991; Hong & Xiet-
ing, 1997; Jakimoski & Kocarev, 2001a; Kocarev et
al., 1998; Kocarev & Jakimoski, 2001; S. Li et al.,
2001a, 2002a; Masuda & Aihara, 2002; Matthews,
1989; Papadimitriou et al., 1997, 1999, 2001; L. Shu-
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jun et al., 2001; Tao et al., 1998a,b; Zhou & Ling,
1997a]. At the same time, cryptanalytic works of
proposed chaotic encryption schemes have been de-
veloped and some chaotic ciphers have been known
insecure [G. Alvarez et al., 2000; Biham, 1991; Cham-
bers, 1999; Jakimoski & Kocarev, 2001b; S. Li et al.,
2001a, 2002c; Wheeler, 1989; Wheeler & Matthews,
1991]. For the recent progress in chaotic cryptogra-
phy with digital chaotic systems, please see [Dachselt
& Schwarz, 2001; Fridrich, 1998; Kocarev et al., 1998;
Kocarev, 2001; S. Li et al., 2002b; Schmitz, 2001;
Silva & Young, 2000].
In [Papadimitriou et al., 2001], a new chaotic ci-
pher is presented, which is a probabilistic symmetric
encryption scheme based on chaotic systems of dif-
ference equations. In this letter, we point out some
problems with this chaotic cipher. Some problems
make Papadimitriou et al.’s chaotic cipher unprac-
tical and insecure, and other ones show that some
remedies should be adopted to improve the perfor-
mance of this chaotic cipher.
This letter is organized as follows. In the next sec-
tion, we will give a brief introduction of Papadim-
itriou et al.’s chaotic cipher. Section 3 gives detailed
analyses and discussions about the above problems
with Papadimitriou et al.’s chaotic cipher. The con-
clusion is given in the last section.
22. Papadimitriou et al.’s Chaotic En-
cryption Scheme
For the sake of readers’ convenience, in this section,
we briefly introduce Papadimitriou et al.’s chaotic en-
cryption scheme and the analyses given in their pa-
per. For more details about the original authors’
descriptions and analyses, please refer to their own
paper.
Papadimitriou et al.’s cipher is a probabilistic sym-
metric cipher that encrypts d-bit plaintexts into e-bit
ciphertexts (e > d), whose encryption and decryption
procedure can be depicted as follows. Here, please
note that we rearrange the processing steps given in
[Papadimitriou et al., 2001] to obtain clearer descrip-
tion.
Encryption: I) Given a chaotic system to gener-
ate a normalized (scaled into the unit [0, 1]) chaotic
orbit {x(n)}∞i=1. II) Use {x(n)}∞i=1 to construct a
virtual state space, i.e., a list of 2d virtual attractors
containing 2e virtual states 1 ∼ 2e as follows: search
1 ∼ 2e in the sequence {round(x(n) · 2e)}∞i=1 until
all integers are found with shuﬄed orders; select 2d
states as the virtual attractors and (pseud-randomly)
allocate the left 2e − 2d states into the 2d attractors.
III) Associate each virtual attractor Va with a mes-
sage symbol by means of a permutation matrix P.
Here, P is a zero-indexed 1 × 2d vector whose el-
ements are 2d shuﬄed virtual attractors between 1
and 2e. IV) Encrypt a message Mc = 0 ∼ 2d − 1 as
follows: firstly mapMc to a corresponding virtual at-
tractor by Va = P[Mc], then pseudo-randomly select
a virtual state SVa allocated into Va as the ciphertext.
Apparently, the last step causes this cipher to be a
probabilistic symmetric block cipher.
Decryption: I & II) Reconstruct the same vir-
tual state space using the same method described in
step I & II of encryption. III) Determine P’s “in-
verse matrix” P−1, which is a one-indexed 1 × 2d
vector whose elements are 0 ∼ 2d − 1. P−1 should
satisfy the following requirement: ∀Mc = 0 ∼ 2d − 1,
P−1 [P[Mc]] = Mc. IV) Retrieval the attractor Va
in which the ciphertext SVa is allocated, and then
recover the plain-message by Mc = P−1[Va].
Assume the association between 2e virtual states
and 2d virtual attractors as a surjective (multiple-to-
one) map Fv : Vs → Va, where Vs, Va respectively
represent the set of all virtual states and the set
of all virtual attractors. Based on Fv, we can con-
ceptually denote Papadimitriou et al. cipher as fol-
lows: encryption – SVa = F
−1
v ◦ P(Mc), decryption
– Mc = P−1 ◦ Fv(SVa). Because F−1v is not unique,
the encryption is probabilistic, while the decryption
is deterministic since P−1 ◦ Fv is unique.
Papadimitriou et al. adopted the following chaotic
systems with difference equations to construct the
normalized chaotic orbit: i = 1, . . . ,K,
xi(n+1) =
K∑
j=1
aij ·fi (bij · xj(n) mod Ri + Li) , (1)
where Ri = Ui − Li and [Li, Ui] is the definition do-
main of fi, and the functions fi (i = 1 ∼ K)1 are
suggested being piecewise linear functions with N
break points, because the piecewise linearity is helpful
to simplify the implementation and can ensure per-
fect properties of the above chaotic systems. Since
there are K chaotic sub-systems in total, any one
sub-orbit or the combination of some of them may be
available to generate virtual state spaces for encryp-
tion/decryption2.
On the security of the chaotic cipher, two possible
attacks are analyzed in [Papadimitriou et al., 2001]:
1) directly reconstructing the virtual state space; 2)
accurately mimicking the chaotic dynamics that leads
to the construction of the virtual state space. The
complexity of the first attack is calculated based on
the estimated number of all possible virtual state
spaces, which is derived to be (k!)m · kn−k·m, where
k = 2d is the number of all virtual attractors and
n = 2e is the number of all virtual states (m is the
least number of the virtual states allocated in each
virtual attractor)3. The complexity of the second
attack can be calculated using the similar method
given in another Papadimitriou et al.’s paper [Pa-
padimitriou et al., 1997, 1999].
Other merits claimed by Papadimitriou et al. in-
clude: 1) piecewise linearity of the selected chaotic
system makes the computational complexity rather
sufficient and the cipher easy to be scaled; 2) experi-
ments show that this cipher can run much faster than
many other conventional ciphers, such as DES, IDEA
and RC5.
1In [Papadimitriou et al., 2001], the authors mistook fi, i =
1 ∼ K for fi, i = 1 ∼ K − 1.
2This issue is not explicitly mentioned by Papadimitriou et
al., but the first sub-orbit is used in their C++ codes, which are
available upon request to S. Papadimitriou’s e-mail address:
stergios@heart.med.upatras.gr.
3In [Papadimitriou et al., 2001], N,K,M are used here,
among which N,K are easily confused with the number N and
K in Eq. (1). To avoid such a confusion, we use the lowercase
formats n, k,m to replace N,K,M in [Papadimitriou et al.,
2001].
33. Problems with Papadimitriou et
al.’s Chaotic Cipher
In this section, we will point out and give detailed
discussions on the following problems with Papadim-
itriou et al.’s chaotic cipher. In the last subsection,
we will also point out some positive points about this
chaotic cipher.
1. Paradox exists between the practical implemen-
tation and high security: the size of the cipher-
text and the plaintext (d and e) should be large
enough to ensure high security, while it should
be small enough to enable practical implemen-
tation.
2. The value of the number of all possible virtual
states is deduced by a wrong way.
3. The security analysis given in [Papadimitriou
et al., 2001] is inadequate and the security to
exhaustive attack is overestimated.
4. The merit of fast encryption speed is dependent
on the defect about the values of d and e.
5. When digital chaotic systems are realized in fi-
nite precision, the dynamical degradation will
arise and some remedy should be employed to
improve it.
6. No explicit instructions are given to show how
to select the 2d virtual attractors from the 2e
integers, how to allocate the 2e virtual states
into the 2d attractors, and how to generate the
permutation matrix P.
3.1. Paradox on the values of d and e
In Papadimitriou et al.’s cipher, the plaintext size is d
and the ciphertext size is e. To provide high security,
d and e should be large enough. However, we note
that d and e must be small enough to make the con-
struction and storage of the virtual state space prac-
tical, considering the following two facts: i) the time
consuming on the construction of virtual states space
is O(2e); ii) the number of required memory units
to store the constructed virtual state space is O(2e).
Apparently, e cannot be too large, generally, e > 30
may be unpractical for the implementation on a PC
(230 = 1G, so large a number will make the construc-
tion of the virtual state space very very slow and
the storage impossible for a PC with less memory
than 1G Bytes). In addition, since d and e will not
be too large, an eavesdropper can exactly reconstruct
the virtual state space to break the cipher once you
get O(2e) ciphertexts and the corresponding plain-
texts. That is to say, the cipher is insecure to known-
plaintext, chosen-plaintext and chosen-ciphertext at-
tack [Schneier, 1996]. In weaker conditions, it may
be possible for an eavesdropper to deceive legal users
with faked ciphertexts, if he can get enough (but
less than 2e) plaintexts and the corresponding cipher-
texts.
Actually, in conventional cryptography, the kernel
task is to design nonlinear bijective maps from the
plaintexts to the ciphertexts controlled by a single se-
cret key, where the bijective nonlinear maps play the
same role as the virtual state space used in [Papadim-
itriou et al., 2001]. Generally speaking, the nonlin-
ear maps used to encrypt the plaintext and decrypt
the ciphertext are represented by the nonlinear oper-
ations of the plaintexts and the secret keys, not pre-
calculated in advance like the virtual state space in
[Papadimitriou et al., 2001]. Then why not directly
use pre-calculated and pre-stored bijective maps? It
is because that the representation and storage of the
map will become entirely unpractical if the size of
the plaintext and the ciphertext is large enough. For
example, let us consider DES: the size of the plain-
text/ciphertext is 64, it is obviously impossible to rep-
resent and store a map from 264 plaintexts to 264 ci-
phertexts with limited memory units (264 = 16GG!!).
Here, we would like to cite what B. Schneier writ-
ten in his book “Applied Cryptography” [1996, Sec.
14.10.7]: it will be rather easy to design a secure block
cipher if you have a HUGE memory device to store
HUGE-size S-Boxes. From such a viewpoint, the ba-
sic idea of virtual state space used in Papadimitriou
et al.’s cipher is unpractical and insecure.
3.2. Wrong deduction of the number of all
possible virtual state spaces
To estimate the security of the proposed cipher to the
attack of reconstructing the virtual state space, the
number of all possible spaces is deduced to be (k!)m ·
kn−k·m by Papadimitriou et al. Based on the above
result, it is claimed that the security of the proposed
cipher is much higher than many other traditional
ciphers, such as DES, IDEA and RSA.
In this subsection, we point out that the deduction
given in [Papadimitriou et al., 2001] is not correct
and the right number is not (k!)m · kn−k·m. The rea-
son can be explained by the following two problems:
1) the number may be underestimated since dif-
ferent mk states may be selected in the first stage;
2) the number may be overestimated since some
placements are repeatedly enumerated. For the sec-
ond problem, we can give one example. The following
4two placements A and B are same and will be repeat-
edly enumerated by Papadimitriou et al.’s deduction:
all states are allocated into the same attractors for
placement A and B, but a state SVa is allocated in
attractor Va in the first stage for placement A, and
SVa is allocated in attractor Va in the second stage
for placement B. Since the two problems influence the
result in paradoxical ways, the right number may be
smaller or larger than (k!)m · kn−k·m.
In the following context, we try to solve this prob-
lem in another way. Please note such a fact: the or-
ders of all virtual states allocated into a same attrac-
tor cannot influence the decryption of one ciphertext,
although it may make the ciphertexts different for a
same plaintext. Hence, the number of all possible
virtual state spaces can be re-described as the solu-
tion of the following combinatorial problem: place n
different balls into k different boxes with at least
m balls in each box (n ≥ mk), how many possible
placements are there?
Then what is the right solution to the above com-
binatorial problem? In fact, to the best of our knowl-
edge, no explicit solution to this problem has been
reported till now, except some special ones (the Stir-
ling’s number of the second kind is the special case
when m = 1 [Yang, 1997]). Assume the number is
g(n), the best solution to this problem is a recursive
one:
When n = mk:
g(n) =
(
mk
m,m, · · · ,m
)
=
(mk)!
(m!)k
. (2)
When n > mk:
g(n) =
n−1∑
t=mk
g(t)
(
k · (n+m−1t )− (n+m−1t−1 ))
n−mk
k
· (n+m−1n ) . (3)
For the deduction of the above solution, please see
Appendix. The above solution is utterly different
from the one given in [Papadimitriou et al., 2001].
For example, when n = mk, the right number should
be (mk)!
(m!)k
, but the number is (k!)m as the deduction in
[Papadimitriou et al., 2001]. In many cases, the num-
ber derived by Papadimitriou et al. is smaller than
the actual one. Then can we say that the security of
Papadimitriou et al.’s cipher may also be underesti-
mated sometimes? The answer is negative, which
will be explained in the next subsection with more
details.
3.3. Inadequate security analysis
In the last subsection, we have shown that the num-
ber of all possible virtual state spaces g(n) should
be the value expressed by Eq. (2) and (3), not
(k!)m·kn−k·m obtained in [Papadimitriou et al., 2001].
In this subsection, we point out that the value of g(n)
and the number of all possible secret keys cannot be
directly used to show the high security of the pro-
posed cipher as Papadimitriou et al. did in [2001]. It
is a natural result of the following four facts F1∼F4.
F1) Most virtual state spaces are too “similar” to
ensure the high security of the chaotic cipher. To
quantitatively measure the similarity of two different
virtual state spaces A,B, we firstly give a notation
d(A,B) called the distance of A and B as follows:
d(A,B) =
∑n
i=1 Com(Ai, Bi), where Ai, Bi are the
virtual attractors containing the ith virtual states in
A, B, and
Com(Ai, Bi) =
{
1, Ai 6= Bi
0, Ai = Bi
. (4)
Here, d(A,B) = 1 ∼ n represents the number of vir-
tual states allocated into different attractors in A,B.
Apparently, the smaller d(A,B) is, the more similar
the two virtual state spaces A and B are.
As a result of the property of the distance d(A,B),
similar virtual state spaces will generate similar
ciphertexts with uniformly distributed plaintexts.
Thus, an eavesdropper can use a similar virtual state
space instead of the real one to decrypt most plain-
texts (the more similar the used one is to the real
one, the more plaintexts will be decrypted). To
obtain enough high security, the distance between
any two available virtual state spaces A,B should be
large enough (d(A,B) = n will be really perfect and
d(A,B) ≥ n/2 may be acceptable in many cases), but
the number of such “good” virtual state spaces will
be much much smaller than the number given by
Eq. (2) and (3).
F2) Not all possible virtual state spaces can be con-
structed with the chaotic system (1). Once the chaotic
orbit {x(i)}∞i=1 and the algorithm to construct the
virtual state space is given, the generated virtual
state space will be uniquely determined. The above
fact means that the number of all possibly generated
virtual state spaces is also controlled by the number
of all possible chaotic orbits as well, not only by Eq.
(2) and (3). Then what is the number of all possible
chaotic orbits? Apparently, it is determined by the
number of all possible secret keys, i.e., all possible
control parameters and initial conditions.
In Papadimitriou et al.’s cipher, the following con-
trol parameters of Eq. (1) are used as the secret
keys4: aij , bij(i, j = 1 ∼ K), Ri, Li(i = 1 ∼ K)
4The initial conditions are not involved as part of the secret
5and NK break point values of f1 ∼ fK (only N
break point values if f1 = f2 = · · · = fK)5. Assume
the computed sensitivities of the above parameters
are all 2−L (L is the adopted finite computing preci-
sion) and all parameters are confined in [0, 1], we can
roughly calculate the number of all possible secret
keys6: NK = (K2+2K) · 2L+K ·
∏N−1
i=0 (2
L− i)/N !.
Generally, 2 < N  2L and 2 < K  2L, then
NK ≈ K · 2LN/N ! (when f1 = f2 = · · · = fK ,
NK ≈ 2LN/N !).
F3) Different secret keys may generate the same
virtual state space. This fact is obviously right if
NK > g(n). Together with the above fact F3, we
can see the upper bound of the security of the pro-
posed chaotic cipher should be min(g(n),NK). Thus,
although g(n) may be rather HUGE when n = 2e and
m = 2d are large enough (d = e = 8 may be OK),
the actual security of Papadimitriou et al.’s cipher
will be limited by NK. From the approximate value
of NK derived in the last paragraph, the key entropy
of Papadimitriou et al.’s cipher to exhaustive attack
will be about LN − log2(K/N !) in general cases, or
even smaller than LN − log2(K/N !) if d and e are
small enough to make g(n) < NK.
F4) Papadimitriou et al.’s chaotic cipher is in-
secure to the known-plaintext, chosen-plaintext and
chosen-ciphertext attacks, because of the defect about
the small values of d and e. This issue has been
discussed in Sec. 3.1. We can see the key entropy
of Papadimitriou et al.’s cipher to the three attacks
will be e, generally, which will be much smaller than
LN − log2(K/N !).
3.4. Other problems
The dependence of the perfectly fast encryption speed
on the essential defect about the values of d and e. In
Table 2 of [Papadimitriou et al., 2001], a comparison
of the encryption speed of the proposed chaotic cipher
with some traditional ciphers is given on a Celeron
433 MHz PC with 96 MB RAM. Papadimitriou et
al.’s chaotic cipher can run at a very high speed 327.2
Mbps, which is much faster than other ones. The
prefectly fast encryption speed can be explained by
keys in [Papadimitriou et al., 2001]. 0.1 is used to initialize
x1(0) ∼ xK(0) in Papadimitriou et al.’s C++ codes.
5In [Papadimitriou et al., 2001], the number of break point
values of fi are denoted by N in Sec. 2.2 and by n in Sec. 3.
In this letter, we use N at all time.
6Papadimitriou et al. didn’t give the deduction of NK in
[2001] and only referred the readers to their another two pre-
vious papers [1997; 1999]. Here, we use a somewhat different
way to calculate the value of NK.
the following fact: once the virtual state space has
been constructed, the encryption and decryption pro-
cedure (step IV) can be realized by simple Look-Up-
Table operations. But please keep in mind that this
merit owes to the defect that the whole virtual state
space must be firstly constructed and then stored in
memory, which makes the cipher unpractical and in-
secure as we have mentioned in Sec. 3.1.
Dynamical degradation of chaotic systems realized
in finite computing precision. When chaotic sys-
tems are realized in finite precision, their dynami-
cal properties will be far different from the proper-
ties of continuous-value systems and some dynamical
degradation will arise, such as short cycle length and
decayed distribution. This phenomena has been re-
ported and analyzed by many researchers [Binder &
Jensen, 1986; Blank, 1997; S. Li et al., 2001b; Pal-
more & Herring, 1990; Wheeler, 1989; Wheeler &
Matthews, 1991]. Essentially speaking, the dynam-
ical degradation can be attributed to the discrete it-
erations in finite-state machine [Robert, 1986; Wael-
broeck & Zertuche, 1999]. Generally speaking, it
is rather difficult to exactly analyze such dynamical
degradation of digital chaotic systems. But some use-
ful theoretical results have been obtained for some
special chaotic systems, such as a class of piecewise
linear chaotic maps [S. Li et al., 2001b]. Since the dy-
namical degradation may worsen the cryptographic
properties of Papadimitriou et al.’s chaotic cipher,
some remedies must be used to overcome this de-
fect. Fortunately, several engineering methods can
be used to fulfill such a task, such as the perturba-
tion algorithms suggested in [Cˇerna´k, 1996; Tao et
al., 1998a,b; Zhou & Ling, 1997b].
The lack of explicit instructions on how to select
the 2d virtual attractors, how to allocate the 2e vir-
tual states into the 2d attractors and how to generate
P. This problem is not so serious since many differ-
ent pseudo-random coding algorithms can be used to
do the above three operations. Of course, different
algorithms may lead to different performances on the
pseudo-randomness of the selection of the 2d virtual
attractors, the allocation of the 2e virtual states the
permutation matrix P. In addition, if we know the
algorithm used in the cipher, it may be possible to
analyze the generated virtual state space. Such anal-
ysis may be useful to develop some new attack whose
complexity is less than the exhaustive attack’s (at
least under some special conditions). Some further
research should be made to investigate this issue.
63.5. A Concrete Example
To emphasize the paradox between insecurity and
infeasibility of Papadimitriou et al.’s chaotic cipher,
now let us give a concrete example for future ex-
planation. Considering the chaotic system is just
used to generate the virtual states with higher key
entropy, we will use logistic map f(x) = 4x(1 − x)
instead of the chaotic system suggested in [Papadim-
itriou et al., 2001], which will not make essential in-
fluence on the performance of this cipher. Assume
d = 6, e = 8, the secret key is the initial condition of
logistic map x0 = 0.1111. Without loss of generality,
assume m = 3, and the 2d virtual attractors, the al-
locations of other 2e− 2d virtual states (i.e., the map
Fv) and the permutation matrix P are all pseudo-
randomly generated7 with the control of the embed-
ded system function rand initialized by a (secret or
public) seed s = 0.2222. Here, please note neither
x0 or s is specially chosen to support our negative
result. The constructed map Fv (i.e., the association
between the virtual states and the virtual attractors)
and the permutation matrix P are respectively shown
in Fig. 1 and 2.
For such a encryption system, if we can get enough
known/chosen plaintext/ciphertext pairs, it is possi-
ble to obtain the unique decryption function P−1◦Fv.
Since d, e is not too large, we can store this func-
tion as a look-up table in the computer to decrypt
all future ciphertexts. What about the number of re-
quired known/chosen plaintexts? In Fig. 3, under
the assumption that the plaintext is uniformly dis-
tributed in the discrete set {0, 1, · · · , 2d− 1}, we give
the experimental result of the relationship between
the number of obtained virtual states/attractors and
the number of known/chosen plaintexts. We can see
O(2e) plaintexts are enough to obtain all 2e virtual
states (i.e., all possible ciphertexts) and O(2d) plain-
texts are enough to obtain all 2d virtual attractors.
What O(2e) plaintexts mean? Consider the plain-
texts are 6-bit numbers, O(28) plaintexts mean only
O(192) bytes, which approximates to the length of a
short article. Once all 2e virtual states are obtained,
we can reconstruct the ciphertext-plaintext map (i.e.,
the decryption function) P−1 ◦ Fv. Apparently, such
insecurity defect is induced by the small values of d, e.
But if we increase d, e to resist such attacks, the con-
struction and storage of Fv will become impractical
either.
Finally, let us see the number of all possible maps
7As we have pointed out in Sec. 3.4, no explicit instructions
are given to direct how to generate them.
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Fv. When n = 2e = 256,m = 3, k = 2d = 64,
the number of all possible placements of n balls in k
boxes (each one at least m balls) is so great that it
even cannot be calculated with most scientific com-
puting software: g(n) 10308 ≈ 21023. However, the
number of all possible initial conditions x0 is gener-
ally much much smaller than g(n). When x0 is a
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IEEE-standard 64-bit floating-point decimal [IEEE,
1985], then Nk = 262  g(n). Thus, the complexity
against brute force attack will be O(min(g(n),Nk)) =
O(262). However, from the analysis in Sec. 3.1 and
the above experimental data in this subsection, the
complexity against known/chosen plaintext attack is
only O(2e) = O(28) O(262).
3.6. Positive points about Papadimitriou et
al.’s chaotic cipher
Although Papadimitriou et al.’s chaotic cipher has
some problems and its general structure is not suit-
able as a basis to construct more secure chaotic block
ciphers, some basic ideas used in the cipher may still
be helpful in cryptography.
One useful point is about the possibility to change
Papadimitriou et al.’s chaotic cipher from a block
cipher to a stream cipher, which may disable the
attacks based on the re-construction of the virtual
attractors list and the permutation matrix P (via
known/chosen plaintexts). A possible method is to
generate time-variant permutation matrix P, or use
a stream sub-cipher to confuse the ciphertext of the
Papadimitriou et al.’s chaotic cipher. Applications of
such an idea in the design of digital chaotic ciphers
can be found in [Baptista, 1998; S. Li et al., 2001a,
2002a].
Another point is the idea to construct virtual state
space from a chaotic orbit, which can be extended
as a new way to generate nonlinear n × m S-Boxes
without trapdoors [Schneier, 1996]. Apparently, such
chaotic S-Boxes can be dependent on the secret key,
and then be incorporated into some conventional key-
driven ciphers to construct new chaos based ciphers.
In fact, such cryptosystems based on chaotic S-Boxes
have been proposed by some researchers [Jakimoski
& Kocarev, 2001a; Kocarev & Jakimoski, 2001; S. Li
et al., 2002a], but more detailed studies should be
done to analyze the performance of such ciphers.
4. More Discussions on Digital
Chaotic Ciphers
As we know, the initial boom of digital chaotic
ciphers happened near the year of 1990 (almost to-
gether with the occurrence of secure communication
approaches based on chaotic synchronization [G. Al-
varez et al., 1999]): Three papers [Matthews, 1989;
Wheeler, 1989; Wheeler & Matthews, 1991] appeared
in a same journal – Cryptologia and another three
papers [Biham, 1991; Forre, 1993; Habutsu et al.,
1991] appeared in a same conference – EuroCrypt’91.
After a short silent period8, the second boom started
from 1997 and lasts till now9: many entirely new
chaotic ciphers have been proposed and cryptana-
lyzed, and some reviews have been published to sum-
marize the ideas of using chaos to design cryptosys-
tems [G. Alvarez et al., 1999; Dachselt & Schwarz,
2001; Go¨tz et al., 1997; Kocarev et al., 1998; Kocarev,
2001; Schmitz, 2001; Silva & Young, 2000]. Some dis-
cussions on the future research in chaotic cryptogra-
phy have been given in [Dachselt & Schwarz, 2001;
Kocarev, 2001; Schmitz, 2001]. L. Kocarev suggest
that the future research should focus on the essential
relationships between the chaos and cryptography,
not ad hoc designs of more and more novel chaotic
encryption schemes [Kocarev, 2001]. W. Schwarz et
al. have made some research connecting conventional
ciphers with chaos [Dachselt & Schwarz, 2001; Go¨tz
et al., 1997]. In this section, we would like to show our
opinions on the future research about digital chaotic
ciphers, based on the contributions and comments of
other researchers.
4.1. Suggestions for the Design of a Good
Chaotic Cipher
Carefully investigate all current known chaotic ci-
phers, we can give some suggestions on the design of a
“good” chaotic cipher, where the term “good” means
three aspects of a cipher: high practical security, fast
8In that time, a lot of papers are contributed to another
similar but different topic: secure communication approaches
based on synchronization of analog chaotic circuits.
9As our statistics, at least 15 technical papers (most ones
are journal articles) have been published since 2001. Please
refer to the references list of [S. Li et al., 2002b].
8encryption speed and simple implementation.
Suggestion 1 – Realizing digital chaotic sys-
tems via pseudo-random perturbation, or us-
ing discretized chaotic systems whose dynam-
ical properties have been proven. As we have
mentioned, there exists degradation on the dynam-
ical properties of digital chaotic systems realized in
finite precision. Under the situation that no system-
atic theory to measure such degradation, some reme-
dies must be adopted to improve the dynamical prop-
erties of digital chaos. The perturbation algorithm
by a simple PRNG (such as a m-sequence generator)
is suggested by us, since it has considerable perfor-
mance in practice. The quantized versions of some
continuous-value chaotic maps may be also OK, but
it is desired that the designers prove (at least “ex-
plain with some convincing experimental evidences”)
their dynamical (i.e., cryptographic) properties.
Suggestion 2 – Avoiding the use of multiple
iterations for one ciphertext in chaotic block
ciphers. The slow encryption speed of most chaotic
block cipher is chiefly induced by the use of multiple
iterations for one ciphertext. Some newly proposed
chaotic block ciphers [Jakimoski & Kocarev, 2001a;
Kocarev & Jakimoski, 2001; S. Li et al., 2002a; Pa-
padimitriou et al., 2001] overcome this problem and
can be used as good references.
Suggestion 3 – Using fixed-point arithmetic
instead of floating-point arithmetic. Appar-
ently, floating-point arithmetic will lower the encryp-
tion speed and increase the realization complexity
and cost. Thus, fixed-point arithmetic is suggested.
In addition, the fixed-point arithmetic is also helpful
to improve the portability between different software
platforms or hardware structures. There are another
defect about floating-point arithmetic: the floating-
point decimals are not distributed uniformly in the
discrete space, which will make it much more compli-
cated and difficult to theoretically analyze the degra-
dation of digital dynamical properties. Of course,
some chaotic systems cannot realized with fixed-point
arithmetic, if they are expressed by complicated func-
tions (such as sine). Such complicated chaotic sys-
tems should be avoided as possible in practice (see
also the following suggestion).
Suggestion 4 – Using the simplest chaotic
systems as possible, piecewise linear chaotic
systems are good candidates. Many complicated
chaotic systems are usually suggested to ensure the
security of developed chaotic ciphers. But the use of
complicated chaotic systems will lower the encryption
speed twofold: i) the more complicated the chaotic
systems are, the more time the chaotic iterations (i.e.,
the encryption/decryption procedure) will consume;
ii) many complicated chaotic systems must run with
floating-point arithmetic, which makes the iterations
further slower. Generally speaking, we suggest using
piecewise linear chaotic systems (such as the class of
chaotic maps whose digital dynamical properties has
been partially proved in [S. Li et al., 2001b]), from
the considerations of security, speed, and implemen-
tation. If piecewise linear chaotic maps cannot be
used in some applications, choose the simplest chaotic
systems that are available.
Suggestion 5 – Using multiple chaotic sys-
tems instead of one single one in chaotic
stream ciphers. Almost all digital chaotic ciphers
are claimed to be secure by the authors when they are
proposed, but many of them are actually not. Then
what about the security of other “secure” chaotic ci-
phers? Because of the lack of related theory, no per-
fect solutions can be found at present. We can only
give a useful suggestions: use multiple chaotic sys-
tems instead of a single one, since the combination of
multiple chaotic systems “should” make the crypt-
analysis much more difficult, especially when each
chaotic system has different equation and/or different
initial condition (and/or control parameters). Such
an idea has been used in some chaotic cipher [S. Li
et al., 2002a; Protopopescu et al., 1995; L. Shujun et
al., 2001] and chaotic spread spectrum communica-
tion approaches [Heidari-Bateni & McGillem, 1994],
it seems that more perfect performance can be ob-
tained. Also, please note that Papadimitriou et al.’s
chaotic cipher also employed multiple chaotic systems
to make the cryptanalysis difficult. Of course, to sup-
port the correctness and rationality of this suggestion,
further investigations are needed.
Suggestion 6 – Avoiding all known weak-
nesses of previous digital chaotic ciphers. It
is natural that we should avoid all security defects
that have been reported by cryptanalysts, which is
a basic principle widely-acknowledged in cryptology
community [Schneier, 1996].
4.2. Some Open Topics about Digital Chaotic
Ciphers
In [Kocarev, 2001], L. Kocarev suggested that the
future research in chaotic cryptography should focus
on the relationships between chaos and cryptography,
not the ad hoc design of new chaotic ciphers. Basi-
cally, we agree to their opinion. The following are
some open topics in chaotic cryptography. Of course,
new structures of chaotic ciphers may still be useful,
if some really novel ideas are introduced and better
performance is provided.
Theory about chaos in discretized space. To
9estimate the dynamical properties of digital chaotic
systems, a systematic theory about chaos in discrete
space is needed. But such a theory has not been es-
tablished yet. The most comprehensive discussion on
this topic can be found in [Blank, 1997]. In 1999,
H. Waelbroeck and F. Zertuche tried to translate the
definitions of deterministic chaos to the context of
discrete state space (called “discrete chaos”). Some
results on the dynamical properties of digital piece-
wise linear chaotic maps have been given in [S. Li et
al., 2001b].
Cryptographical properties of the pseudo-
randomness generated by digital chaos. The
pseudo-random sequences generated by digital chaos
are kernel parts in many chaotic ciphers. How to
measure the cryptographical properties of the chaotic
pseudo-random sequences is an unsolved problem. In
continuous chaos theory, information entropy can be
used to depict the rate of the information loss as
the chaotic systems are iterated [Hao, 1993]. Simi-
lar concept may be also used to qualitatively explain
the unpredictability of pseudo-random numbers gen-
erated by digital chaos, the idea is used in [Bern-
stein & Lieberman, 1990; L. Shujun et al., 2001]. Of
course, more strict analysis is desired. Some theoreti-
cal contributions have been done to explore the corre-
lation of pseudo-random bits generated by continuous
chaos, such as the work made by T. Kohda and A.
Tsuneda in [Kohda & Tsuneda, 1997]. In the future,
some theoretical works on cryptographical properties
of the pseudo-random sequence generated by digital
chaos should be made.
Chaos in conventional ciphers. From essen-
tial viewpoint, any conventional cipher can be con-
sidered as a chaotic or pseudo-chaotic cipher, since
the confusion and diffusion are the basic tools to real-
ize security [Schneier, 1996]. Some chaotic behaviors
hiding in conventional ciphers have been reported by
W. Schwarz et al. [Go¨tz et al., 1997]. In the future
research, answers to the following questions will be
useful for the design of both conventional and chaotic
ciphers: 1) Can we use chaos theory to explain the
nonlinear functions and operations used in conven-
tional ciphers? For example, can the mod function
defined on finite filed be considered as a discretized
chaotic map10? 2) Can we re-define the confusion and
diffusion property of a good cipher with chaos theory?
3) Can we find a way to connect the security mea-
surement (such as linear complexity in stream-cipher
cryptography) in conventional cryptography with the
10Consider the digital tent map realized in fixed-point dis-
crete space.
measurements (such as the information entropy) in
chaos theory?
General models for the design of digital
chaotic ciphers. Several general models have been
proposed in [Jakimoski & Kocarev, 2001a,b; Kocarev
et al., 1998; L. Shujun et al., 2001], further efforts on
the proposed models will be helpful to exploit the re-
lationship between chaos and cryptography. The idea
of combing chaotic block cipher and chaotic stream
cipher to construct product cipher is also promising,
such as the chaotic ciphers presented in [E. Alvarez
et al., 1999; Baptista, 1998; S. Li et al., 2002a].
Cryptanalysis and enhancement of known
digital chaotic ciphers. As we know, the recent
advances in today’s block-cipher cryptology are pro-
moted by the emergence of the differential and lin-
ear cryptanalysis, which shows the importance of the
cryptanalysis in cryptology [Schneier, 1996]. We be-
lieve any new attacks of some chaotic ciphers will im-
pulse the progress of chaotic cryptography. Recently,
two similar chaotic cryptosystems proposed in [E. Al-
varez et al., 1999; Baptista, 1998] have been cryptana-
lyzed and improved recently by many researchers [G.
Alvarez et al., 2000; Garc´ıa et al., 2002a,b; Jakimoski
& Kocarev, 2001b; S. Li et al., 2001a; Wong et al.,
2001; Wong, 2002], which reveals a fact that many
useful knowledge about how to design a good chaotic
cipher can be found in such active arguments.
5. Conclusion
Recently, a new probabilistic symmetric cipher based
on chaotic systems has been presented in [Papadim-
itriou et al., 2001]. In this letter, we point out some
defects of this chaotic cipher: 1) d and e are too small
to ensure both practical implementation and high se-
curity; 2) the deduction of the number of all possible
virtual state spaces is wrong; 3) inadequate analy-
sis leads to overestimated security; 4) fast encryp-
tion speed is the result of the first defect; 5) dynam-
ical degradation of digital chaotic systems should be
remedied; 6) no detailed instructions about the con-
struction of the virtual state space are given.
Generally speaking, because of the small values of
d and e, Papadimitriou et al.’s chaotic cipher is un-
practical and insecure to known/chosen-plaintext and
chosen-ciphertext attack. Its merit of fast encryption
speed may disappear if the defect about d and e is
cancelled. In addition, from our discussions in Sec.
3.3, the security of the cipher is not so high as an-
alyzed in [Papadimitriou et al., 2001], and the key
entropy to exhaustive attack will be not larger than
LN − log2(K/N !).
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We believe it is a promising and interesting idea to
use digital chaos as the new source of cryptosystems,
but more detailed studies should be done on the way
to reach a really good digital chaotic cipher.
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Appendix – The Recursive Solution of the Combinatorial Problem in Sec. 3.2
Here, we give the deduction of Eq. (2) and (3).
Assume g(n) is the number of all possible placements with respect to n. Because
(x1 + x2 + · · ·+ xk)n =
∑
a1+a2+···+ak=n
(
n
a1, a2, · · · , ak
)
xa11 x
a2
2 · · ·xakk , (5)
We have
g(n) =
∑
a1+a2+···+ak=n
ai≥m
(
n
a1, a2, · · · , ak
)
. (6)
Consider the following exponential generating function:
∑
n≥mk
g(n)
xn
n!
=
∑
n≥mk
 ∑
a1+a2+···+ak=n
ai≥m
(
n
a1, a2, · · · , ak
) xn
n!
=
∑
n≥mk
 ∑
a1+a2+···+ak=n
ai≥m
n!
a1! · a2! · · · ak!
 xa1+a2+···+ak
n!
=
∑
a≥m
xa
a!
k . (7)
Consequently,
( ∑
a≥m
xa
a!
)k
is the generating function of g(n).
Apparently, it is hard to derive the explicit equation of g(n) denoted by n,m, k, so let us investigate the
recursive expression of g(n).
Rewrite Eq. (7) as
∑
i≥mk
g(i)x
i
i! =
( ∑
a≥m
xa
a!
)k
, and solve the derivatives of both sides, we can have:
∑
i≥mk−1
g(i+ 1)
xi
i!
= k ·
∑
j≥m
xj
j!
k−1 ·
 ∑
j≥m−1
xj
j!
 , (8)
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Multiply the both sides of the above equation by
∑
j≥m
xj
j! ,
( ∑
j≥m
xj
j!
)
·
( ∑
i≥mk−1
g(i+ 1)x
i
i!
)
= k ·
( ∑
a≥m
xa
a!
)k
·
( ∑
j≥m−1
xj
j!
)
= k ·
( ∑
a≥mk
g(a)x
a
a!
)
·
( ∑
j≥m−1
xj
j!
) . (9)
The left hand side (LHS) of Eq. (9) is
LHS =
∑
i≥mk+m−1
 ∑
s+t=i
s≥m
t≥mk−1
(
g(t+ 1)
s!t!
xi
)
=
∑
i≥mk+m−1
 ∑
s+t=i
s≥m
t≥mk−1
g(t+ 1)
(
i
s
) xii! . (10)
The right hand side (RHS) of Eq. (9) is
RHS = k ·
∑
i≥mk+m−1
 ∑
s+t=i
s≥m−1
t≥mk
(
g(t)
s!t!
xi
)
=
∑
i≥mk+m−1
k ·
 ∑
s+t=i
s≥m−1
t≥mk
g(t)
(
i
s
) xii! . (11)
Thus, we can know the following fact: when i ≥
mk +m− 1,
∑
s+t=i
s≥m
t≥mk−1
g(t+ 1)
(
i
s
)
= k ·
∑
s+t=i
s≥m−1
t≥mk
g(t)
(
i
s
)
. (12)
Since s+ t = i,
(
i
s
)
=
(
i
t
)
, then the above equa-
tion can be transformed to:
i−m∑
t=mk−1
g(t+ 1)
(
i
t
)
= k ·
i−m+1∑
t=mk
g(t)
(
i
t
)
. (13)
Substitute t′ = t + 1 into the left hand side of the
above equation, we can get:
i−m+1∑
t′=mk
g(t′)
(
i
t′ − 1
)
= k ·
i−m+1∑
t=mk
g(t)
(
i
t
)
. (14)
Based on Eq. (14), we can derive the recursive
solution of g(n).
When n = mk:
g(n) =
(
mk
m,m, · · · ,m
)
=
(mk)!
(m!)k
. (15)
When n > mk: assume i−m+1 = n, i = n+m−1.
Substitute i = n+m− 1 into Eq. (14), we can get:
n∑
t=mk
g(t)
(
n+m− 1
t− 1
)
= k ·
n∑
t=mk
g(t)
(
n+m− 1
t
)
.
(16)
Simplify the above equation:
g(n) =
n−1∑
t=mk
g(t)
(
k · (n+m−1t )− (n+m−1t−1 ))
n−mk
k
· (n+m−1n ) . (17)
From Eq. (15) and (17), this problem is solved.
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